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The Web caters to 
niche markets as 
easily as it does 
to mainstream 
tastes. Will it help 
extreme religious 
groups achieve 
unprecedented 
prominence?
The traditional market badly serves the tail 
of the curve (that is, the demand for less 
popular items), because those economies 
don’t exist on such a small scale. The Web 
removes many costs traditionally associated 
with market operations, thus fattening the 
tail—that is, allowing businesses to cater to 
a longer tail.
In this article, we examine this theory 
with regard not to an economic market, but 
rather to the competitive marketplace of 
ideas. In a religious context, we interpret the 
long-tail theory as predicting that the Web 
will allow extreme or strict sects to flourish 
in an unprecedented way by helping propo-
nents cater to the long tail online. If this is 
true, it threatens the orthodox understand-
ing of the dynamics of religious extrem-
ism. It would also undermine the associated 
idea that groups’ convergence on the middle 
ground of religious beliefs cultivates and is 
cultivated by liberal civic virtues. If radical 
groups can flourish while preaching virtues 
diametrically opposed to liberalism, free-
dom of religion might not be so good for lib-
eralism after all.
Religious Freedom and  
Religious Markets
The 18th-century Enlightenment thinkers 
promoted rationality and strongly opposed 
religious irrationalism, or what was called 
enthusiasm. Many, including David Hume, 
held the intuitive position that government 
sponsorship of moderate religion would help 
damp down extremism. A “ghostly practitio-
ner” (Hume’s phrase) who relied on adherents 
for financial support would move to extreme 
positions “to excite the languid devotion of 
his audience,” but if the government paid sal-
aries to the clergy of established churches, it 
would be “superfluous for them to be farther 
active than merely to prevent their flock from 
straying in quest of new pastures.”2
An important thesis for the future of the Web, particularly for e-commerce, is Chris Anderson’s long-tail theory.1 In the language of 
economics, the traditional marketplace best satisfies the bulge of the normal de-
mand curve, where most consumers congregate, thanks to economies of scale.
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However, in his theory of market 
societies, The Wealth of Nations, the 
economist and philosopher Adam 
Smith denied this intuitive doctrine, 
arguing instead that state sponsorship 
would merely aid extremism by de- 
incentivizing moderates and increas-
ing the vigor of religious enthusiasts. 
“It is with them as with the hussars 
and light infantry of some armies; 
no plunder, no pay.”3 A free religious 
marketplace was the way, paradoxi-
cally, to promote moderation. With 
total freedom of conscience, one 
would expect this to create “a great 
multitude of religious sects” that 
would be forced to compete for the 
center ground.
The teachers of each sect, seeing them-
selves surrounded on all sides with 
more adversaries than friends, would be 
obliged to learn that candour and mod-
eration which is so seldom to be found 
among the teachers of those great sects 
whose tenets, being supported by the 
civil magistrate, are held in veneration 
by almost all the inhabitants of extensive 
kingdoms and empires.… The teachers of 
each little sect, finding themselves almost 
alone, would be obliged to respect those 
of almost every other sect, and the con-
cessions which they would mutually find 
it both convenient and agreeable to make 
to one another, might in time probably 
reduce the doctrine of the greater part of 
them to that pure and rational religion, 
free from every mixture of absurdity, im-
posture, or fanaticism, such as wise men 
have in all ages of the world wished to see 
established.3
Smith’s view seems to have been 
vindicated. The more controversial 
part of his claim was that this multi-
plicity of disestablished religious 
groups would converge on the mod-
erate center ground. The reason for 
this, he conjectured, would be that 
because the clergy would depend 
financially on donations from their 
flock, they would naturally seek to 
maximize membership. Because most 
potential adherents exist in the mod-
erate center ground, religious groups 
would gravitate toward the center. 
Hence, there is a feedback loop—
less-rigid doctrine puts off fewer 
people, while a desire to increase 
membership will engender compro-
mise and consensus. Churches that 
do not take practical steps to move 
toward a more consensual position 
will fail to exploit economies of scale 
and tend to wither.
Smith’s observations led to the 
theory of the church-sect cycle. The 
church-sect cycle explains the per-
sistence of small but “radical” sects 
and the seemingly eternal recur-
rence of the splintering of religious 
groups—the rise, decline, and frag-
mentation of denominations.4
The logic of the church-sect cycle is 
a continual process of movement from 
a position in tension with the social 
environment to one in harmony with 
it, until a split occurs and a new sect 
arises that seeks to assert a new high-
tension position. As a sect grows and 
begins to attract many members, it in-
evitably moderates its positions. Pop-
ularity and security come at the price 
of having to accommodate a wider 
array of members. The largest pool of 
potential members occupies the mod-
erate center ground—of the social 
environment—so sects gravitate to 
this pool of potential adherents. But 
those who desire a higher-tension ver-
sion of the faith become increasingly 
restless and dissatisfied, until a rift 
occurs and a splinter group moves to 
reaffirm the old position by splitting 
with the main group and forming a 
new sect.4
What explains the predominance 
of moderate adherents is the low cost 
of participation. If a religious group’s 
beliefs and practices are harmonious 
with the surrounding social environ-
ment, there is little or no cost to par-
ticipate. The adherent doesn’t have to 
change his or her beliefs, morals, diet, 
daily rituals, dress, or language. The 
benefits of religious participation—
spiritual and physical well-being, so-
cial recognition, collaborative goods, 
and the like—accrue with no outlay 
from the individual.
Similarly, this also explains the per-
sistence of membership by a smaller 
set of people in radical sects. Here, 
the membership costs are higher—
often much higher—including differ-
ences from the social environment in 
such things as diet, dress, rituals, and 
so forth, as well as an enclave mental-
ity and even group persecution. High 
costs deter free riding; those who re-
main members are playing their part 
through costly participation. Yet mem-
bers perceive the benefits as also being 
much higher. They see goods such as 
group solidarity and higher spiritual 
worth gained through sacrifice as out-
weighing the costs.
The Mormons (the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints) provide 
an excellent example of this process. 
Early in their history, the Mormons 
were persecuted because of their het-
erodox views of polygamy and the 
nature (and purpose) of Jesus and the 
Trinity, and because of their strange 
foundational myth of the transfer of 
the Book of Mormon to Joseph Smith. 
The persecution culminated in Smith’s 
assassination, and the cult relocated 
from Missouri (where revelation de-
creed it should be based) to sparsely 
populated Utah. As the church grew, 
it moved toward the center, with eco-
nomic and theological factors playing 
a part. Weeks after the US Supreme 
Court upheld Congress’ decision to 
enforce the forfeiture of the Mormon 
Church’s property because of its sup-
port for polygamy, the church pub-
lished its 1890 Manifesto, renouncing 
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the practice. In the face of civil rights 
protests in 1978, the Mormon Church 
revoked its ban against black priests. 
Now, the Church is the fourth- 
largest in the United States and one of 
the fastest growing worldwide. Mor-
mons such as the Osmonds and, more 
recently, Mitt Romney have become 
mainstream figures.
However, the 1890 Manifesto also 
sparked a series of splits, as various 
fundamentalist cults moved away 
from the consensual position. The 
Apostolic United Brethren is one of 
the most moderate, and probably the 
largest, with just under 10,000 adher-
ents. The more extreme Fundamen-
talist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints, on the other hand, has suf-
fered since its president, Warren Jeffs, 
was convicted of accessory to rape for 
arranging illegal marriages between 
men and underage girls. Although it 
remains comparable in size to the Ap-
ostolic United Brethren, the identity 
of its current leader is unknown.
A corollary of the church-sect cycle 
is what Nancy Rosenblum has termed 
the logic of congruence.5 Participa-
tion in groups helps cultivate certain 
values and virtues in the members, 
the nature of which depends on the 
nature of the group in question. Mem-
bership of moderate groups that exist 
in little tension with the surrounding 
social environment tends to produce 
individuals predisposed to uphold 
and perpetuate the values and vir-
tues of that environment. For Adam 
Smith, the logic of congruence was 
an extremely useful social benefit. 
The free market in religion would cre-
ate civically virtuous citizens minded 
to uphold the basic pillars of liberal 
society.
Online Religion  
and Extremism
The theoretical analysis based on 
Smith’s free-market philosophy has 
been borne out over the intervening 
years. However, two new ideas make 
Smith’s analysis worth revisiting. 
First, the Web has been associated, 
rightly or wrongly, with an increase 
in religious extremism. Second, many 
commentators have asserted that the 
Web, by removing the friction in in-
formation flow, has effected a funda-
mental change to market structures. 
Given the juxtaposition of these 
two developments, it’s worth ask-
ing whether changes to the free mar-
ket of religious ideas wrought by the 
Web have been a cause of extremism. 
In this section, we’ll examine the first 
idea; in the next, we’ll look at the 
second.
Certainly, extremists are using the 
Internet. One survey found that the 
Internet was a powerful tool for hate 
groups to reach an international au-
dience, recruit members, link diverse 
groups, and achieve maximum im-
age control.6 Terror groups have used 
the Internet for communication, data 
mining, networking, recruitment, mobi-
lization, providing instructions and 
online manuals (for things such as 
bomb-making), planning and coor-
dination, fundraising, and attacking 
rival terrorists.7
Frictionless information markets 
facilitate distributed group dynamics 
as well as reducing costs. In a face-
to-face world, where sect members 
would communicate in each other’s 
physical presence, a small number of 
people would be a handicap. A sect of 
6,000 members randomly distributed 
across the globe would have mini-
mal group dynamics. But online, they 
could use Web resources to commu-
nicate and to promote solidarity. On 
Facebook, 6,000 friends would be 
a large number to have. Even a very 
small percentage of cyberspace is a 
lot of people.
Technology is a friend to the spread 
of religious ideas. In a world of media 
with high entry barriers (TV, radio, 
newspapers), ideas markets are driven 
by scarcity. On the Web, with low bar-
riers to entry, they are characterized 
by abundance. Religious works are 
often given away free (see, for exam-
ple, www.freekoran.com/index.php), 
and texts are available online. Bibli-
cal texts can be sent to your Psalm 
Pilot and wrestled with on large dis-
cussion spaces (such as www.ebible.
com). You can download a GodCast 
(www.godcast.org). You can even be 
a censor: Yusufali is a Trojan worm 
that works its way into a remote com-
puter’s hard disc, then censors objec-
tionable Web sites by minimizing the 
browser and substituting appropri-
ately stern verses from the Qur’an.
But the low barriers to entry mean 
that more texts are being distrib-
uted than in the days of scarce ideas. 
Some changes appear (to an outsider) 
frivolous—the GodCast website in-
cludes a translation of Biblical texts 
into Klingon. Jediism (www.jedi-church.
com) and Matrixism (www.geocities.
com/matrixism2069) now claim to 
be genuine religions. Other changes 
are more challenging—it has been 
argued that Qur’anic texts and 
commentaries distributed most fre-
quently online are those that accen-
tuate the differences between Islam 
and Christianity and Judaism, rather 
than those acknowledging their com-
mon roots and assumptions. This 
wider distribution is important at 
a time when religiosity is growing 
and yet there is profound ignorance 
about religions, even in very religious 
countries. A scarce supply of reli-
gious texts corrals popular religious 
thought into a relatively strict space; 
abundance means that there are no 
restrictions of availability to provide 
a filter.
Individual entrepreneurs can be 
better at engaging with people than 
major churches. Their interaction 
IS-24-06-Ohar.indd   4 10/19/09   5:03:13 PM
NovEMbEr/dEcEMbEr 2009 www.computer.org/intelligent 5
models are decentralized, two-way, 
and networked, rather than central-
ized, one-way, and hierarchical. The 
result feels more like a conversa-
tion than a lecture. Web technology 
has clearly changed the nature of the 
religious interaction. The Web is 
now being used to create environ-
ments for prayer, meditation, and pil-
grimages (to cybershrines like www.
iol.ie/~readout/mta; or go to www.
sainthood.com to create your own). In 
the course of this it will tend to alter 
the effects of these kinds of religious 
experience. The Web, combined with 
widespread satellite television, has re-
duced the localism formerly promi-
nent in many religions and created 
a technologically mediated “global” 
religiosity.
Use of the Web is skewed toward 
the young and so helps to change 
church and sect demographics. In 
general, older people are more main-
stream in their belief, so the online 
demography again facilitates frag-
mentation and aggravates the church-
sect cycle.
The radical heterogeneity of on-
line behavior means that “normal” 
behavior is harder to find online. 
People behave in different ways; fur-
thermore, they understand a given 
online situation differently. Some us-
ers are highly experienced and others 
inexperienced. For example, analysis 
of behavioral networks generated by 
patterns of network traffic shows that 
Internet users’ behavior is so marked 
by heterogeneity that it’s meaningless 
to develop models for average Internet 
use.8 There is no average Web user, 
and, a fortiori, that makes it easier 
(indeed trivial) for a sect member to 
diverge from the mean.
The question is whether these per-
ceived changes stack up to produce 
a genuinely qualitative change in the 
marketplace of religious ideas and 
the church-sect cycle. Can we say 
with any confidence that the new 
technologies have damaged modera-
tion? The arguments we have enu-
merated in this section are weighty. 
However, have extreme cults gained 
prominence as a byproduct of terror-
ist actions of groups such as al-Qaeda 
and Aum Shinrikyo, and are changes 
in communication technology sec-
ondary to willingness to abuse weap-
ons of mass destruction in ways that 
invite media coverage?
The Religious Market  
in Cyberspace
If the nature of strict or extreme reli-
gious activity does seem to be changing, 
how has the Web contributed to that? 
We will try to address this question by 
looking first at Cass Sunstein’s theories 
about personalization, then exploring 
Anderson’s long-tail theory in this con-
text, and finally assessing the relevance 
of empirical evidence that seems to un-
dermine the long-tail theory.
The Daily Me
The logic of congruence that tends to 
drag extremists to the center can be 
sidestepped if the adherent person-
alizes the content he or she receives. 
As Sunstein has argued, it’s easy for 
a Web user to avoid information 
that may contradict his deeply held 
beliefs.9 The public space through 
which we all have to move offline 
does not exist online. Internet users 
can avoid general information ag-
gregators, such as the BBC or large 
national newspapers’ Web sites, in 
favor of partial sites, such as blogs, 
that preach to the converted. Indeed, 
network analysis tends to back up 
Sunstein’s claim, showing that politi-
cal blogs tend to link to other blogs 
that support similar rather than 
opposing views. Arguments that 
blogs help provide the “wisdom of 
crowds” are misplaced, because they 
assume some method of aggregation 
of views that does not occur in the 
blogosphere.9
The result, argues Sunstein, is that 
extreme views receive large amounts 
of positive feedback and become en-
trenched. If the extremist intends to 
impose his views through a political 
process, this is unproblematic: the 
political process itself (whether dem-
ocratic or bureaucratic) will involve 
persuasion and therefore (such are 
the rules of interlocution) the risk of 
receiving a convincing opposing ar-
gument. But not all extremists inter-
act politically; tight positive-feedback 
loops for extremist views are dan-
gerous if the extremist—whether re-
ligious, such as a suicide bomber, or 
nonreligious, such as one who under-
takes random shootings in school or 
at work—anticipates acting violently.
The Long Tail
By lowering the costs of information 
transfer and reducing the friction of 
interactions, the Web allows culture 
to evolve unmediated (or less medi-
ated) by cost considerations. Ander-
son sets out what he calls “six themes 
of the Long Tail age,” applicable to 
markets in general, comparing the 
fortunes of niche products with ex-
tremely popular ones. In an offline 
market, popular goods, which reap 
economies of scale of production, are 
often produced at the expense of the 
niche products, which can’t command 
enough demand to justify the sacri-
fice of shelf space.1 Each of these six 
themes affects the “theological econ-
omy” of the church-sect cycle, if we 
interpret “popular item” as a main-
stream religion, church, theology, or 
ideology, and “niche product” as a 
more extreme position or sect.
In most markets, there are far more •	
niche goods than popular items. In 
theological terms, we might see this 
as the existence of a small number 
IS-24-06-Ohar.indd   5 10/19/09   5:03:14 PM
6  www.computer.org/intelligent IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
S o c i e t y  o n l i n e
of large, stable, inertial, institu-
tionalized religions, surrounded by 
countless theological variants that 
don’t attract many adherents.
Digital technologies, including on-•	
line distribution, search, and broad-
band have lowered the costs of 
reaching those niches. A religious 
ideology is largely information and 
can be discovered and distributed 
cheaply using search engines, tag-
ging, and so on.
Filters, including search engines, •	
recommender systems, rankings, 
and social networks are required 
to drive demand down a long tail. 
Such filters are likely to be present 
as someone curious and dissatis-
fied about religion engages with on-
line communities such as a group 
of Facebook friends, a MySpace 
group, an Internet forum, a bulle-
tin board, or a mailing list. Books 
purchased on Amazon will include 
further recommendations. Blogs will 
link to related blogs.
Exploitation of the long tail causes •	
demand to flatten. As niches at-
tract more consumers, demand for 
the bigger hits declines. As people 
are drawn to strict sects they’ve 
learned about, adherence to major 
churches appears to decline, espe-
cially as churches and sects are ri-
vals, in that membership in one 
religious group is generally incom-
patible with membership in others. 
As information has spread about 
alternatives, adherence to main-
stream religions has declined.
Niches add up.•	  Small sects are indi-
vidually insignificant, but their to-
tal number can be significant. The 
number of “unaffiliated Christians” 
(that is, persons professing Christi-
anity in censuses but not claiming 
affiliation with a particular group) 
is 119.5 million worldwide, and 
48.6 million in the US (up from 
18.8 million in the US in 1900).
A long-tail market reveals the nat-•	
ural shape of demand. The picture 
of religious belief is presented with 
fewer distribution bottlenecks, and 
people can seek out smaller sects 
closer to their individual beliefs.
Anderson suggests three forces pro-
duce the long tail.1 First, the tools of 
production are democratized, which 
lengthens the tail by providing more 
niche goods. For our discussion, this 
links to the technology for religious 
communication, including Web 2.0 
(many sects share videos on YouTube, 
for instance). Extremist, extralegal 
groups may also use security systems 
and privacy-enhancing technologies. 
The second force is the democratiza-
tion of the tools of distribution—in 
other words, the aggregation of de-
mand through search engines, tag-
ging, social networking, and so on. 
This fattens the tail by providing 
more access to niche goods. Third, 
supply and demand must be con-
nected, so filters send people down 
toward the niches at the tail.
The Web provides a means for 
people to sidestep the problems and 
lower the costs of being in an ex-
tremist sect. Public hostility and in-
difference can be ignored. The only 
cost that the Web leaves untouched is 
the “pure” cost of ritual, which is the 
chief mechanism for ensuring loyalty 
and continuity.
The Empirical critique  
of the Long Tail
The long-tail theory has recently come 
under some pressure from empirical 
analyses of actual markets. Anita El-
berse has argued that the market for 
music downloads and DVD rentals 
hasn’t changed as predicted, and that 
retailers are still rational to focus on 
the blockbusters.10 An analysis of mu-
sic downloads by Will Page shows 
that the curve is a log-normal curve 
with little in the tail—0.4 percent of 
tracks accounted for 80 percent of 
downloads.11 R. Alexander Bentley, 
Paul Ormerod, and Mark Madsen 
confirm that when consumer prefer-
ence is very changeable, the inventory 
size that maximizes profit for a re-
tailer is pretty small.12
This doesn’t necessarily under-
mine the long-tail theory in all fields, 
though. Matthew Salganik, Peter 
Dodds, and Duncan Watts provided 
an insight into what is going on by 
looking at music downloads among a 
large sample of young people.13 The 
volunteers were divided into groups, 
some of which received recommenda-
tion feedback based on the purchases 
of other members of the group, while 
others did not. The market shape of 
the groups without recommendations 
had longer tails. The groups with rec-
ommendations had more traditionally 
shaped market curves, but the “hits” 
in each group were different. That is, 
the groups all showed a tendency to 
converge, but around a different set 
of songs.
This implies that a key factor is in-
tramarket communication. The origi-
nal short-tail market form happened 
because of the friction in the market, 
which was removed by Web technol-
ogy. Recommender systems seem to 
substitute for the friction by focus-
ing preferences, especially in volatile 
markets such as music downloads, on 
items that have previously sold well. 
The friction has been, in effect, re-
placed in the system. Collaborative 
filtering requires historical sales data, 
so items that have not sold well are 
disadvantaged.
How does this play out in the 
marketplace for religious ideas? On 
the one hand, there are no recom-
mender systems (“If you are an 
adherent of this deity, you may also 
like …”), and collaborative filter-
ing of religious ideologies would 
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be hard. On the other hand, religious 
sectaries do seek out others—a small 
hard core of comrades seems impor-
tant for many types of religious experi-
ence. Furthermore, although religions 
themselves are hard to filter collabor-
atively, important associated items—
books, videos of sermons, and so on—
can be subject to recommendations. 
This will tend to narrow the field.
These factors will probably shorten 
the tail in the religious market. How-
ever, given the lack of a dedicated pat-
tern of recommendations, and given 
the weight of the considerations we 
discussed earlier in this article, it seems 
reasonable at this stage to assume that 
such markets have a longer tail than 
they did before the introduction of 
Web technology. Empirically testing 
this hypothesis would be an important 
step for research in this area.
Policy Issues and 
Applications
The Web depends for its function on 
decentralization of control. No cen-
tral body determines who should 
link to whom, or what one can put in 
one’s Web page. This is an engineer-
ing essential, as any centralization 
would create bottlenecks that would 
not allow the Web to scale.
If our arguments are correct, the 
policy issue for those who wish to re-
duce extremism online boils down to 
the question of how to shorten and 
fatten the tail of the religious market. 
In many ways, this is what Sunstein’s 
policy proposals attempt to do, by 
subsidizing and supporting delibera-
tive domains, adopting formal codes 
of conduct, and linking to sites with 
opposite points of view.9 Our earlier 
arguments imply that the provision of 
information about other users’ pref-
erences would be a method for doing 
this, and new technologies such as 
the Semantic Web could be exploited 
for these purposes.
However, the difficulty for policy-
makers is that to expose relatively ex-
treme ideas to arguments from more 
moderate positions, it is necessary to 
give them air time. Information fil-
ters must be trusted—many consum-
ers trust Amazon’s recommendations, 
but if they always pointed away from 
some publishers and toward oth-
ers they would not be trusted, and 
would therefore not work. To squeeze 
and shorten the tail of the religious 
market place, information provision 
must be trusted—and a distrust of 
authorities, of course, is part of the 
problem of religious extremism.
Debate must be visible, free, and 
fair; otherwise there will be little 
effect. It is in extremists’ interests to 
lengthen the tail, and it seems that 
their best strategy is to provide in-
formation about their ideas in the 
marketplace without also providing 
information about others’ preferences 
and behaviors. The ideal extrem-
ist will be informed about ideas, but 
socially isolated. Thus, the personal-
ization systems that worry Sunstein 
can only be part of the problem— 
collaborative filtering is a personaliza-
tion technology that seems to shorten 
tails. So also, extremists will try to 
discourage debate and suppress links 
to opposite points of view, in order to 
create the type of intellectual ghetto 
to which Sunstein objects.
Heterodox sects have always ap-peared and disappeared. They 
have often been suppressed with vio-
lence. They have often been linked 
with a growing assertiveness in classes 
of people hitherto denied a voice. The 
Web has a number of advantages for 
such people, including the ability to ca-
ter to niche tastes, as Anderson argues.
There are also reasons to think that 
the Web may have changed the terms 
of religious trade qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively. It’s impossible to 
impose a heavy-handed secular con-
tent editor, because it would break 
the Web. Furthermore, the church-
sect cycle strongly implies that ex-
tremism won’t go away; however, 
fears that it will spread beyond a hard 
core are likely to be overblown. Like 
the poor, the strictly religious will al-
ways be with us.
An online free market in religion 
would be a bumpy ride, and with the 
frictionless communication the Web 
facilitates, the ride may be bumpier 
than before. Terrorists and extremists 
use the Web with great facility, just 
as they used the printing press and 
roads. We don’t have sufficient evi-
dence that this relatively new form of 
communication technology has qual-
itatively changed the nature of reli-
gious groupings. But in policy terms, 
we’re beginning to see the limits of 
Anderson’s long-tail thesis, and it is 
in the interests of the opponents of 
extremism to ensure that those lim-
its persist in the marketplace for reli-
gious ideas.
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